"I recognize the importance of situatedness yet at the same time resist the notion that one's thinking can be explained merely in terms of the community to which one belongs. Such reductionism eventually leads to a social determinism that ultimately absolves individuals from personal responsibility for their thoughts (73)."
"How one reacts to the postmodern depends to a large extent on what one thinks it is: everything thus depends on the way one initially describes postmodernity (74)."
"Derrida's claim that "there is nothing outside the text" is not a silly claim about what there is in the world. He is not claiming that "to be is to be textually conceived" or that only writing exists. He is rather making the (bulveristic!) point that what we know about things is linguistically, which is to say culturally and socially constructed (78)."
"The peril of postmodernity is that losing the capacity to be informed and transformed by God's Word; the promise of postmodernity is that of rediscovering aspects of God's Word that enable us to get wisdom rather than mere information (ibid.)."
"As Cyrus released Israel from her Babylonian captivity and encouraged the rebuilding of the Jerusalem temple, so postmodernity releases the church from its Athenian captivity to modernity and enables the return of certain exiled themes, religion and transcendence among them (80)."
"The danger in correlating theology with this or that philosophy (or any other discipline) is that of domesticating the divine, of reducing the strange new world of the Bible to this-worldly terms, of exchanging the scandal of the cross for the pottage of intellectual respectability (81-2)."
"Second, we need a variety of descriptions or vocabularies in order to highlight the different levels or aspects of reality. Such an aspectival realism has nothing to do with a perspectivalism that holds that what we see is constructed by our theories. No, the word is there, mind-independent and differentiated, yet indescribable apart from human constructions and only partially accessible to any single theory. The moderate realist insists that though our knowledge of the world is partial it can still be true: "we need a pluralism of vocabularies in order to give an adequate account of how matters stand" for the same reason that we need a plurality of maps (e.g., historical, topographical, geological, political) in order to navigate our way through the world (88)."
The last quotation, in particular, expresses why the language and vocabulary of contemporary analytic philosophy is incapable of adequately capturing the sum of human experience. Thus, we should look beyond the confines that analytic philosophy places on human knowing.
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